Behavioral biases in pension fund trustees’ decision making by Weiss-Cohen, L et al.
This is a repository copy of Behavioral biases in pension fund trustees’ decision making.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148253/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Weiss-Cohen, L, Ayton, P, Clacher, I orcid.org/0000-0002-8892-6697 et al. (1 more author)
(2019) Behavioral biases in pension fund trustees’ decision making. Review of Behavioral 
Finance, 11 (2). pp. 128-143. ISSN 1940-5979 
https://doi.org/10.1108/RBF-05-2018-0049
© 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited. This is an author produced version of a paper 
published in Review of Behavioral Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's 
self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
PENSION FUND TRUSTEES’ DECISION-MAKING 1
Behavioral biases in pension fund trustees’
decision-making
Leonardo Weiss-Cohen
City University of London
Peter Ayton
City University of London
Iain Clacher
University of Leeds
Volker Thoma
University of East London
Abstract
Purpose. Behavioral ﬁnance research has almost exclusively investigated
the decision-making of lay individuals, mostly ignoring more sophisticated
institutional investors. This paper aims to better understand the relatively
unexplored ﬁeld of investment decisions made by pension fund trustees, an
important subset of institutional investors, and identify future avenues of
further exploration.
Approach. This paper starts by setting out the landscape in which pen-
sion fund trustees operate and make their decisions, followed by a literature
review of the extant behavioral ﬁnance research applicable to similar situa-
tions.
Findings. Despite receiving training and accumulating experience in ﬁ-
nancial markets, these are limited and sparse, therefore pension fund trustees
are unlikely to be immune from behavioral biases. Trustees make decisions
in groups, are heavily reliant on advice, and make decisions on behalf of
others. Research in those areas have uncovered many ineﬃciencies. It is
still unknown how this speciﬁc context can aﬀect the psychological eﬀects
on their decisions.
Implications. Given how much inﬂuence trustees’ decisions have on asset
allocation and by extension in ﬁnancial markets, this is a surprising state of
aﬀairs. Research in behavioral ﬁnance has had a marked inﬂuence on policy
in the past and so we anticipate that exploring the decisions made within
pension funds may have wide ramiﬁcations for the industry.
Value. As far as we are aware, no behavioral research has empirically
tested pension fund trustees’ decisions to investigate how the combination
of group decisions, advice, and surrogacy inﬂuence their decisions and, ulti-
mately, the sustainability of our pensions.
Most of the published research in behavioral ﬁnance has investigated systematic bi-
ases in investment decisions made by individuals (for comprehensive reviews, see Barberis
& Thaler, 2003; Shefrin, 2009). This biased behavior can be described as anomalous depar-
tures from normative decisions as predicted by economic and ﬁnancial theory. For example,
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) have shown how individuals display naive diversiﬁcation when
deciding how to invest their own savings plans: they allocate a uniform distribution of their
assets across the options available. Individuals’ choices are determined by the number of
options available, regardless of the nature of the options. Hence their choices reﬂect the
options oﬀered, e.g., the proportion invested in stocks depends strongly on the proportion of
stock funds oﬀered, while normative ﬁnancial theory claims they should be informed by the
risk-return characteristics of each option. While some individuals decide their retirement
asset allocation directly, as researched by Benartzi and Thaler, most people rely on insti-
tutions, such as their pension funds, to invest the assets on their behalf. In this situation,
the investment decision is not made at an individual level, but at an institutional level.
Financial investors can be traditionally split into two main categories: individual
investors and institutional investors; with the latter covering pension funds, insurers, mutual
funds, hedge funds, corporations, and the public sector. Despite the overwhelming interest
of behavioural ﬁnance research in individual investors and their decisions, they are not the
most important inﬂuencers in the ﬁnancial markets. In the UK, according to the Investment
Association,1 a trading body representing UK investment managers, only 19% of the assets
under management in the UK were held on behalf of retail clients, with an overwhelming
79% being held for institutional clients (The Investment Association, 2017). More than
half of the institutional investors assets belong to pension funds. In Europe, according
to the European Fund and Asset Management Association,2 the proportions in 2015 were
27% in retail and 73% in institutional hands, with pension funds representing around one
third of the latter ﬁgure (European Fund and Asset Management Association, 2017). The
proportional representation of pension funds assets has also grown in the last ten years,
and is expected to continue growing, with government pushing individuals to enroll more
aggressively into pension funds, for example by using automatic enrollment.
While institutional investors, and pension funds in particular, are large signiﬁcant
players in ﬁnancial markets, very little academic attention has been given to researching
the behavioral aspects of their ﬁnancial decisions. Given the issues facing pension funds
worldwide, their importance to global ﬁnancial markets, and the lack of attention their
decision-making has received in research, further exploration of their decision-making is
crucial. It is essential that investment decisions of pension funds are made wisely, in order
to ensure the retirement income of future pensioners. Before deﬁning the potential areas
where cognitive biases can surface in pension fund trustees’ decisions, we ﬁrst need to
establish the landscape in which they operate.
The assets of occupational pension funds are typically organised as trust entities, and
managed by a board of trustees (Bunt, Winterbotham, & Williams, 1998). According to
1www.theinvestmentassociation.org
2www.efama.org
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a survey in Clacher, McNair, and Hodgett (2017b), the majority of trustee boards have
between ﬁve and seven members. Larger funds with larger sizes of trustee boards will tend
to create specialised sub-committees, thus reducing the size of the group ultimately making
certain decisions, such as investment decisions (Myners, 2001). The trustee board has a
ﬁduciary duty to act in the best interests of the underlying members of the fund, who are its
ultimate beneﬁciaries. It is possible that these ﬁduciary pressures, and the threat of legal
action if they are breached, might inﬂuence the decision-making of trustees - for example,
by increasing behavioural inertia (Myners, 2001), by increasing the reliance on external
advisers (Pratten & Satchell, 1998), or by relying on non-ﬁnancial criteria for investment
decisions (Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002). Crucially, they decide on how and where to invest
the assets of the pension fund, in order to ensure that members will receive a satisfactory
income upon retiring (Pratten & Satchell, 1998). The boards tend to meet quarterly or
half-yearly, which means that the decisions they make are not frequent, and the feedback
they receive on their decisions may take years to emerge (Clacher et al., 2017b). Contrast
this against more dynamic market decisions made by traders and brokers, which typically
involves immediate feedback. Delayed feedback can disconnect the causal link between
action and outcome, and impair learning, leading to poorer decisions in the future (Sutton
& Barto, 1990).
Pensions regulations in the UK state that at least one third of trustees have to be
nominated by the members of the pension fund (typically the employees of the company
associated with that fund), with the remainder being assigned by the employer (Myners,
2001). Some of the trustees are professional trustees, and the remainder of the trustees tend
to be employees of the company itself. The former group has considerably more experience,
are better trained, and are more sophisticated than the latter (Myners, 2001). While pension
funds are legally required to provide training, the training provided tends to be very limited,
and likely falls short of creating truly sophisticated ﬁnancial agents, with trustees lacking
suﬃcient ﬁnancial and investment knowledge and skills. Some trustees interviewed by
Myners (2001) have claimed that they did not have a good understanding of the ﬁnancial
markets. By contrast, in the survey by (Clacher et al., 2017b), 69% of trustees reported
above average ﬁnancial literacy, although this was self-reported, and could have resulted
from hubris or the illusory superiority resulting from the better-than-average fallacy (Alicke,
1985). Subsequent investigation by Clacher, McNair, and Hodgett (2017a) concluded that
trustees were familiar with the most basic investment management concepts, but struggled
with more specialist areas, while overall trustees of larger schemes fared better than those
of smaller schemes.
Because of the lack of crucial knowledge to perform their duties, and the weight
of their ﬁduciary responsibilities, trustees rely heavily on external advice, in the form of
consultants and advisers (Myners, 2001; Pratten & Satchell, 1998). These advisers bring
with them knowledge in diverse ﬁelds, such as legal, ﬁnancial, accountancy and actuarial.
They are likely to have a disproportional weight on the ﬁnal decisions made by pension
funds. Pension advisers are also called upon for handling the daily administrative duties of
pension funds, and thus might also have a large inﬂuence in the running of pension funds,
for example, by inﬂuencing the way that questions and issues are framed and presented
for trustees when decisions are required, which can make a major diﬀerence to the choices
made (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). According to the Myners report: “trustees tend
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to feel that they lack the expertise to do so, and advisers that they lack the power to make
decisions” (p. 6). Although it is impossible to deny that investment consultants have great
inﬂuence on the decision-making of trustees (Myners, 2001), the majority of trustees claim
to challenge and question their advice, by considering alternatives, instead of taking it for
granted (Clacher et al., 2017a). Despite this, trustees admit that they rarely reject the
consultant’s recommendations in the end, and that they are very reliant on their advice
(Clacher et al., 2017a). While the advice provided by consultants is likely to be helpful to
trustees, and good advice generally can help improve decision quality (Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997), excessive reliance on advice can open avenues for malicious
manipulation, such as an increased inﬂuence of poor or misleading advice (Gino, Brooks, &
Schweitzer, 2012; Soll & Larrick, 2009).
One of the most inﬂuential type of consultants is the investment consultant, who
advises the trustees on where to invest the assets of the pension. While the decision on
where to invest ultimately lies within the trustees’ control, it is clear that the investment
consultants exert great inﬂuence in this decision (Myners, 2001; Pratten & Satchell, 1998).
For example, they provide recommendations of approved funds for the trustees, and while
the trustees could in theory select funds from outside the recommended list, they are un-
likely to do so (Clacher, McNair, & Hodgett, 2017c), and might not even be aware of other
options available to them. The process of selecting funds typically involves looking at a
series of performance metrics, provided by the investment consultant, as well as prospective
managers being directly interviewed by the trustees (Clacher et al., 2017c). Del Guercio
and Tkac (2002) looked at how pension funds select where to invest their assets. They
claim that because of the ﬁduciary duties of pension fund trustees and their responsibility
towards pension scheme members, the ﬁnancial decisions that are made are those that can
be defended ex-post, and where blame can be transferred to others. This agency issue leads
to pension trustees basing their investment decisions on non-ﬁnancial and non-performance
characteristics of asset managers, such as their personality, credibility, reputation and at-
tentiveness. It also increases their reliance on external advice.
Based on the UK government reports on institutional investors (Bunt et al., 1998;
Myners, 2001; Pratten & Satchell, 1998), the surveys on trustees summarized above (Clacher
et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), and our understanding of the pension funds and their decisions,
we identify three characteristics of institutional investor decision-making as topics for further
research: Trustees often make decisions in groups; they often rely on external advisers to
inform their decisions; and they make surrogate decisions on behalf of others. We review
the research on each of these topics in the following three sections.
1 Group decision-making
The decisions of pension funds are made by the board of trustees, which is a mixed
group of individuals selected by the employer and employees (Clacher et al., 2017b; Myners,
2001). Despite common beliefs, and a corporate appetite for brainstorming (Thamia &
Woods, 1984), groups usually do not make decisions eﬃciently, with lower productivity per
person than separate individuals (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Fiﬁć & Gigerenzer, 2014; Paulus,
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Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993).3 This lack of group eﬃciency is due to process losses
associated with group decision-making and their interaction: Groups are not as eﬃcient
as the sum of their parts, with actual performance considerably below the potential of
their pooled resources (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). An exceptional individual alone will often
perform better than a group including that individual, which shows how process losses can
deteriorate individual performance (Hill, 1982). The issue remains, though, of identifying
who was the exceptional individual in the group, and thus combining individuals might still
be better than relying on one randomly selected individual. These process losses act by
reducing motivation and coordination, as a result of several social behavioural issues, such
as social loaﬁng and free-riding, self-censorship and inhibition, and members blocking the
productivity of each other (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). Despite these process losses, there is a
perceived illusion of eﬀectiveness within group members: Individuals tend to believe that
working in a group enhances performance. This illusion arises because individuals might
claim others’ ideas as their own, believe to be individually more productive in a group, and
overestimate the number of ideas that occurred to them during group discussions (Stroebe,
Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1992).
This illusion of eﬀectiveness of group decisions may also be responsible for over-
conﬁdence in group decisions. Overconﬁdence is an issue often encountered in individual
decision-making, when an individual believes that their own responses are more accurate
than they really are (Ayton & McClelland, 1997; Harvey, 1997). Empirical research has
shown that groups are even more conﬁdent than individuals in their decisions, in particular
in judgmental tasks (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995; Sniezek & Henry, 1989; Zarnoth & Sniezek,
1997). Overconﬁdence can be detrimental to decision-making: In ﬁnancial decisions, for
example, it can lead to poor ﬁnancial performance and unnecessary losses via excessive
trading (Barber & Odean, 2000), excessive market volatility (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Sub-
rahmanyam, 1998), and excessive risk taking (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Nosic & Weber,
2010). Conﬁdence in a decision can even be more inﬂuential for behaviour than accuracy,
as conﬁdence mediates actions and might induce poorly chosen behaviours based on wrong,
but conﬁdent, beliefs and judgments (Sniezek, 1992). However, expertise can inﬂuence
conﬁdence, with higher expertise leading to higher conﬁdence in one’s decisions (Traﬁmow
& Sniezek, 1994). Most trustees are not experts in the decisions they make, which could
lower their conﬁdence and reduce actionable behavior, leading to behavioral inertia, an issue
highlighted in Myners (2001).
Group process losses can also impact eﬀectiveness by reducing the amount of infor-
mation shared during group discussions. By bringing together individuals who can share
information, groups should improve the informational set used for decisions, and make
better decisions. While the majority of pension fund trustees might not possess speciﬁc
knowledge required to make the decisions needed for their pension scheme, such as a high
level of ﬁnancial or legal expertise, it was found that many boards had at least one indi-
3Although there are exceptions: in some specific situations, groups can perform better than invididuals,
such as in problem-solving tasks with “eureka” moments and a demonstrably correct solution (Laughlin,
Bonner, & Miner, 2002; Michaelsen, Watson, Black, & Lynch, 1989; Sniezek & Henry, 1989); interventions
can also be used to improve group performance (e.g., Reagan-Cirincione, 1994). However, these do not apply
to the types of subjective decisions and judgments made by pension fund trustees, in which no single correct
answer exists. For more extensive reviews, see Kerr and Tindale (2004) and McGrath and Kravitz (1982).
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vidual who was better informed in each necessary area (Myners, 2001). However, research
has shown that group members do not pool their informational resources: Groups tend to
make decisions using only information which was already previously shared between all the
members of the group, while unshared information available to single individuals are rarely
introduced into the decision-making discussion (Stasser & Titus, 1985).
Groups therefore tend to gravitate towards a common knowledge solution, even when
there is private information available within the group to lead to better decisions (Lu,
Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; Stasser & Titus, 2003). One interpretation is that group members
positively evaluate one another when mentioning shared information (Wittenbaum, Hubbell,
& Zuckerman, 1999) and do not share unique information, which cannot be validated by
other, for fear it will prevent consensus. As a result, commonly available information is
substantially more discussed. High information load makes the bias even stronger, with an
increased focus on shared information and lower tendency to exchange unique information
when there is more information overall (Stasser & Titus, 1987). This is applicable to pension
fund decisions where the trustees may well be overloaded with reports and information:
Reducing the amount of information could lead to more sharing and better decisions. This
bias also appears to become worse with larger group sizes: Smaller groups discuss unshared
information more (Cruz, Boster, & Rodríguez, 1997; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989). Their
ﬁnding supports the approach of larger trustee boards to rely on smaller sub-committees for
certain decisions. Consistent with this notion, Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001) found
that inducing a group norm for critical thought improved attention to unique information
and the quality of decisions.
Despite this apparent lack of sharing of new information, the debates and discussions
occuring during group decision-making often lead to individuals revising their judgements
and decisions, which has been associated with group polarization and choice shifts (Isenberg,
1986). Group polarization occurs when individuals’ views become more extreme after dis-
cussion than they were prior to the interaction (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers &
Lamm, 1976). These discussions can enhance the initially dominant point of view, reinforc-
ing it and making it more salient. Any previously shared information gets excessively more
attention and disproportionally more discussion time. Conﬁrmation bias also plays a role by
helping individuals to more easily ignore and discard conﬂicting information (Klayman &
Ha, 1987). As a result, a choice-shift can occur: The group’s pooled consensus answer tends
to be more extreme than the average of the individuals’ (Hinsz & Davis, 1984; Schroeder,
1973). Hence groups tend to shift and amplify their choices in the direction towards which
most of the group members were already preferring. Facing a situation in which individuals
would initially have a natural tendency to be risk-takers, for example in the domain of
losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), group discussions would lead to a “risky shift,” with
even greater risk-taking; while in the gains domains, if individuals are more naturally risk-
averse, then a “cautious shift” would be observed following group discussions, with lower
risk-taking (Stoner, 1968). One of the reasons why groups can take more extreme positions
than their individual members is because responsibility is diﬀused and blame can no longer
be directly attributed to any particular member directly (Pruitt, 1971). The group shift
can sometimes be so extreme that ﬁnal decisions can even fall outside the range of original
independent decisions (Sniezek & Henry, 1989).
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2 Judge adviser systems
The UK government’s reports on institutional investors concluded that “investment
consultants are highly inﬂuential in [the] investment decision-making” of pension fund
trustees (Myners, 2001, p. 7). One relevant area of psychology research that has exten-
sively investigated a similar type of relationship looks at judge-adviser systems (JAS). In
JAS research, a judge makes the ﬁnal decision, receiving advice provided by one or many ad-
visers, usually in the form of a recommendation (for a review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).
There are many reasons why judges seek advice. They might want improve the quality of
their decisions, minimize decision-making eﬀort, reduce uncertainty, share responsibility for
their actions, and also make it easier to justify their decisions ex-post (Harvey & Fischer,
1997; Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006). They also take advice provided now, in order not
to oﬀend the adviser, maintaining a good on-going relationship, and not to preclude any
future provision of additional advice (Gurmankin, Baron, Hershey, & Ubel, 2002; Sniezek
& Buckley, 1995). Receiving and integrating advice also seems to increase the conﬁdence
levels of judges, making it easier to make decisions and act upon them (Savadori, Swol, &
Sniezek, 2001).
Despite being open to receiving advice, the research shows that judges typically do
not fully integrate the advice into their own decision, but tend to discount most advisory
information received, consistently putting more weight on their own ideas and opinions and
underweighting advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Mannes, 2009; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).
The works by Soll and Larrick (2009) and Soll and Mannes (2011) go even further, showing
that advice is often completely ignored. In contrast, expert medical advice can have a
very strong inﬂuence on patients’ decisions, with some patients fully accepting a treatment
proposed by a doctor, even when it goes against the patients’ preferences (Gurmankin et al.,
2002; Siminoﬀ & Fetting, 1991). It appears that weight given to advice can vary widely, but
the judge’s own personal views are rarely completely ignored, and remains egocentrically
inﬂuential even when they know little about the question at hand and the advice provided
comes from an expert in the ﬁeld (Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Soll & Mannes, 2011;
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Lim and O’Connor (1995) have shown how individuals ﬁnd it
considerably diﬃcult to allocate lower weights on their own judgments even when presented
with reliable advice.
According to Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), this egocentric discounting of advice
occurs because individuals have access to their own reasoning supporting their own judge-
ments, but not to the reasoning supporting the judgements of others. People tend to weight
opinions in relation to the strength of the supporting evidence (Soll & Mannes, 2011), which
could lead to advice with a stronger evidence base being allocated higher weights. Advisers
who can demonstrate expertise, knowledge, and experience of the topic also tend to receive
higher weights (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Gurmankin et al., 2002). Individuals might also
prefer their own opinions as a way of preserving self-esteem, because accepting advice might
result in an undesirable devaluation of one’s opinion: After individuals initially reject ad-
vice in their own area of expertise, thereby conﬁrming their own self-value, they are more
susceptible to accepting advice in other areas of expertise (Soll & Larrick, 2009).
Other factors inﬂuence the weight given to advice, such as the distance between the
advice and the judge’s own prior opinion: The larger the distance, the lower the weight given
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to the advice (Yaniv, 2004b). Therefore, advice that is closer to the judge’s initial views
receives more weight. Consequently, advisers who know a judge well can undertake a process
of nudging them along in small steps, by providing a series of incremental advices over time.
Counter-intuitively, conﬂicting advice can be quite inﬂuential as well, by confusing judges
and lowering their conﬁdence (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Sniezek and Buckley believe that
conﬂicting advice might make the judge believe that the task is more diﬃcult than it really
is, and induce the judge to take a simpler decision heuristic involving luck rather than skill.
Task diﬃculty and task complexity on their own also directly inﬂuences advice usage: On
more diﬃcult tasks, judges used advice signiﬁcantly more than expected (Gino & Moore,
2006; Schrah et al., 2006). Conﬂicting advice which is atypical or unexpected can also lead
patients to wonder if their doctors knew some additional important piece of information
that was not being shared (Gurmankin et al., 2002; Siminoﬀ & Fetting, 1991).
Less conﬁdent judges are more receptive to advice than more conﬁdent ones (Bonaccio
& Dalal, 2006; Gino & Moore, 2006; Savadori et al., 2001). If the lower conﬁdence is
justiﬁed, because the judge lacks appropriate knowledge to decide alone, then relying on
good quality reasonable advice should help improve decision perfomance (Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997). However, lack of conﬁdence is indicative of a reduced
capacity for discerning the quality of the advice received, resulting in excessive weighting
being allocated to unreasonable or bad advice (Gino et al., 2012; Soll & Larrick, 2009). Thus,
if pension fund trustees are not very conﬁdent about their roles, tasks, responsibilities, and
lack appropriate training, they are likely to be inﬂuenced more by poor advice. Groups
are more conﬁdent than individuals, but it remains to be seen how the group interaction
inﬂuences the taking of advice. Advice also receives more weight when the judges feel more
accountable for their decisions, likely a result of the need to be able to justify it and share
responsibility ex-post (Yaniv, 2004a). Given the legal framework in which trustees operate,
and their ﬁduciary obligation, this is likely to be an important moderator, increasing the
reliance that trustees place on advice.
One crucial area relevant for investment consultants providing advice for trustees
relates to the fact that these advisers are paid by the pension funds, and in general judges
are signiﬁcantly more receptive to paid advice than to free advice (Gino, 2008; Sniezek
et al., 2004). This increase in importance given to paid advice appears to be moderated
by credibility, with payment for advice increasing its credibility (Patt, Bowles, & Cash,
2006). The sunk-cost fallacy (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) may apply to the relationship between
payment and usage of advice: Individuals would use advice that was already paid for, even
when it is unhelpful, so not to believe that they wasted any money.
If advice is provided to the judges before they had the chance to form an initial opin-
ion, then their decision can be considered as being cued. This creates an initial starting
position for consideration, akin to an anchoring eﬀect (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). Wilson and Brekke (1994) have called this external inﬂuence and its
eﬀect on decisions “mental contamination.” It is suggested that this process is unconscious
and unwanted, and that judges would prefer not to be cued. According to Wilson and
Brekke, after being cued, most individuals will not be able to correct and adjust appro-
priately, and might be unable to adjust or even overreact and overcorrect. Because of this
eﬀect, cued judges are inﬂuenced more strongly and tend to give more weight to advice
(Rader, Soll, & Larrick, 2015). Cued judges engage in less information processing overall,
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focus their informational search around the advice given, biasing their information process-
ing by reducing the proportion of attention dedicated to the non-cued alternatives (Schrah
et al., 2006; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). In comparison, if judges are not cued, and only
receive the advice after forming their initial opinion, they are considered to be more inde-
pendent, revising their decision after the advice is received. Independent judges are likely
to make better informed, less biased decisions, allocating lower weights to advice (Rader et
al., 2015).
According to Schrah et al. (2006), if given the option, judges will delay advice acqui-
sition until they have formed their initial position, and thus prefer to be independent rather
than cued judges. Being able to make independent initial decisions is crucial to reduce
the inﬂuence of external advisers (Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Pension fund trustees are
more likely to be cued judges, and rely extensively on the information provided by advisers
without the opportunity (or time, or desire) to form prior opinions. However, the need for
independent judges needs to be weighed against the importance of advice. Soll and Mannes
(2011) suggest that independent judges might be reluctant to accept advice in order to avoid
any regrets in the case that their initial judgment proved more accurate than the revised
ﬁnal judgment. If the judge is not an expert in the ﬁeld, ignoring important advice might
lead to lower quality of decisions.
3 Surrogate decision-making
Pension fund trustees make decisions on behalf of others, also known as surrogate
or substituted decisions. The ultimate beneﬁciaries of the decisions made by pension fund
trustees are the members of that pension fund. This is similar to the extensively researched
ﬁeld of surrogate medical decisions, involving end-of-life treatment for incapacitated patients
(for meta-analyses, see Fagerlin, Ditto, Danks, & Houts, 2001). Ideally, the gold standard
is for surrogates to apply “substituted judgement,” which occurs when they make the same
decision that a patient would make if they were not incapacitated. However, this does not
appear to happen in practice. Systematic reviews of the extant corpus of research show
that individuals are very poor at making surrogate decisions: surrogates tend to incorrectly
predict the patient’s wishes quite often, and do not perform much better than chance
(Sulmasy et al., 1998; Uhlmann, Pearlman, & Cain, 1988). Family members tend to perform
slightly better than doctors but are still incorrect around 30% of the time (Moorman,
Hauser, & Carr, 2009; Seckler, Meier, Mulvihill, & Cammer Paris, 1991; Shalowitz, Garrett-
Mayer, & Wendler, 2006).
One of the key aspects of medical surrogate decision-making is that individuals tend
to project their own preferences onto others, and as a result the decisions are closer to
the surrogate’s wishes than to the patient’s (Fagerlin et al., 2001; Pruchno, Lemay, Feild,
& Levinsky, 2005). This might be explained by a belief of the surrogates that the oth-
ers’ preferences would be the same as their own, an assumption of similarity (Cronbach,
1955), which is related to the false-consensus eﬀect (Marks & Miller, 1987). Because surro-
gates project their preferences, research has shown that similarities in taste allow for better
matched predictions of other’s preferences and attitudes (Hoch, 1987): Similar surrogates
are the best surrogates. Surrogates relying on assumptions of similarity to decide on behalf
of others will only make good decisions when they have similar preferences. This approach
works well in certain scenarios in which preferences overlaps, such as between spouses, but
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can also lead to lower quality decisions where there is limited overlap of preferences, such
as doctors predicting for patients.
Matheis-Kraft and Roberto (1997) and Ditto et al. (2001) go on to show that even
holding discussions with the patient about their critical medical care preferences did not
help improve the surrogate judgment, with the surrogate’s own preferences overriding the
information gathered during these discussions. Furthermore, Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, and
Gilovich (2004)’s theory of egocentric anchoring and adjustment has shown how individual’s
estimates of other’s perceptions are anchored around their own perceptions, and later serially
adjusted, taking into consideration what the surrogate might believe the other’s wishes to
be. Therefore, the inability to suﬃciently adjust, even after discussions, can explain these
ﬁndings (see also Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Even when surrogates have similar values, they might still make diﬀerent decisions
for others than for themselves. This issue brings to attention the diﬀerence between what
an individual would choose and what an individual should choose. For example, doctors
tend to make more rational, analytic, and utilitarian decisions on behalf of their patients,
while they rely on simpler heuristics and are more susceptible to cognitive biases when
deciding for themselves (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Ubel, Angott, & Zikmund-
Fisher, 2011). As a result, doctors make more conservative treatment decisions, taking
less risk, on behalf of patients than for themselves, and also than the patients would have
selected. In contrast, Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, and Allgaier (2003) found that when
deciding for others, participants used less information and focused more on single dominant
attributes, making certain dimensions much more salient, such as the negatives aspects of
taking risks for example. In all cases, surrogates made diﬀerent choices for themselves than
they made for others (see also Kray & Gonzalez, 1999).
Individuals often believe that others have more muted emotional responses, and
the inﬂuence of emotion on others’ decisions is less powerfull (Loewenstein, 1996). This
“empathy-gap” between the self and others, is observed because it is easier to understand
one’s own feelings, than someone else’s. People ﬁnd it hard to empathise with others’ dis-
tress at bad outcomes or thrill at good ourcomes, and underestimate their willingness to
take risks. Therefore, the ability of a surrogate to empathize with another person predicts
how well the surrogate discards their own choices and more accurately estimate the other
person’s judgements (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015). As a result, surrogate decision-makers are
more emotionally detached from the decision and its consequences (Kray, 2000). Lack of
introspection into other’s actual preferences is another factor for concern. If a surrogate is
not completely sure about the other’s wishes, then they might prefer to err on the side of
conservativeness and choose what they should do instead.
Making accurate predictions of other people’s risk preferences is an important aspect
of the role of a pension fund trustee. However, research has shown that surrogates are very
poor at such a task (e.g., Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006; Hsee & Weber, 1997). In the risk
domain, the empathy-gap can be applied to the concept of “risk as feelings” (Loewenstein,
Hsee, Weber, & Welch, 2001): Risk-taking is driven by feelings, and because feelings about
oneself are more salient than feelings about others (and others’ feelings as well), this should
lead to more subdued risk-taking behaviour in surrogate decisions. The theory states that
any departures away from risk neutrality are driven by how intensely individuals feel the
pleasure or dread of the outcomes of their risky choices. Therefore, an empathy-gap reducing
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the strength of these feelings should lead to more muted response towards risk-taking or risk-
avoidance, depending on the domain. Because surrogates ﬁnd it diﬃcult to empathise with
others, their decisions tend to be more regressive towards risk neutrality, which might also
appear more normative, and socially expected (Hsee & Weber, 1997). Empirical research
has conﬁrmed: Surrogate decisions are more risk-averse in situations in which safety is
socially desirable (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006; Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2012), and more risk-seeking in situations in which risk is more socially
desirable (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2016; Beisswanger et al., 2003; Hsee &
Weber, 1997). Both directions of deviations of surrogate decisions are ineﬃcient, as the
true risk preferences of the individuals are not being accurately represented. And because
individuals project their own preferences, this would imply that surrogates who are more
risk seeking would recommend more risk taking than a surrogate who is more risk averse.
One of the ways that surrogates can adjust their own judgements while deciding
on behalf of others, according to Epley et al. (2004)’s theory of egocentric adjustment, is
to adjust according to social values to make the decision more socially acceptable. This
“social value theory” posits that individuals decide for others not based on what they
think the others would do, but instead on what is valued by society as the best action to
take (see also Kray, 2000; Stone & Allgaier, 2008). This leads to behaviour that is more
conservative and more regressive to the mean, towards a more neutral and thus more socially
accepted norm (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012). Surrogates make what is essentially an
egocentric decision beneﬁting their own reputation, regardless of what might be best for
the other person (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015). Fear of ex-post guilt for bad outcomes from
poor decision-making can also be a cause of more normative regressive behaviour (Stone,
Yates, & Caruthers, 2002). More normative behaviour should lead to lower volatility in the
outcomes, fewer unexpected results, thereby reducing responsibility if the behaviour was the
more normally socially accepted action. Surrogate decision-making is also more public than
an individual deciding for themselves, which tends to be a more private aﬀair. This might
exacerbate the social inﬂuence on surrogate decisions to preserve the surrogate’s self-image
by providing a more socially acceptable decision (Stone et al., 2002). As a result, people
make riskier decisions for others in domains where risk taking is valued, and less riskier
decisions in those where risk is not valued (Stone & Allgaier, 2008).
One frequent problem with surrogate decision-making is that surrogates very rarely
get feedback for their decisions from the person who is the target of those decisions. West
(1996) has shown how surrogates who learn about their performance via feedback from their
targets also learn to reduce certain biases such as the false consensus or projection, and
learn to rely less on their own preferences over time, as they learn their target’s preferences.
Nevertheless, because the results from deciding for others translate into lower hedonistic
values than when deciding for oneself, the surrogate ends up not as emotionally engaged
with the learning process, the decision made, and its outcomes (Fernandez-Duque & Wifall,
2007). This can explain why surrogates choices are more subdued, more regressive, and
more normative.
4 Conclusions
The decisions made by pension fund trustees are set in environments that diﬀer from
the majority of the research conducted so far in behavioral ﬁnance. The extant research has
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mostly focused on lay individuals making small ﬁnancial decisions that only aﬀect them-
selves (and their households), and most of the biases uncovered apply to that population.
In contrast, pension fund trustees receive training and have some experience in ﬁnancial
markets, which should distance them from the traditional unsophisticated retail investor.
Very little research has been dedicated to the decisions of pension fund trustees so far.
Some research on the most sophisticated ﬁnancial market players, such as professional mu-
tual fund managers, has revealed that they still succumb to decision biases (e.g., Feng &
Seasholes, 2005; Garvey & Murphy, 2004; Shapira & Venezia, 2001). Pension fund trustees
are therefore unlikely to be immune from the biases studied at individual level. Direct
investigation of pension fund trustee behavior is the necessary next step to further advance
the ﬁeld of behavioral ﬁnance.
In addition to an investigation of these biases in the pension fund trustee environment,
it is still unknown how the speciﬁc context of trustee decisions can aﬀect these psycholog-
ical eﬀects on their decisions; this setting may, potentially, mitigate them, or conversely
strengthen them. Pension fund trustees make decisions in groups, are heavily reliant on
advice, and make decisions on behalf of others. So far, we know that group decisions are
not eﬃcient, due to process losses and lack of information sharing between the group mem-
bers. Group discussions tend to lead to choice-shift and group polarization, with more
extreme decisions at group level than at the individual level. While individuals are usually
receptive to advice, they tend to discount the advice and put more weight on their own
judgments. However, the weight given to advice is moderated by numerous factors, many
of them relevant to trustee decision-making, which can increase the weight given to advice,
putting unwanted decision control in the hand of external advisers. When making surrogate
decisions on behalf of others, individuals tend to project their own preferences, instead of
considering the preference of the other. They decide as the other should behave, not as how
they would behave. And they make emotionally more muted, rational, and less empathic
decisions, converging towards more socially acceptable normative behavior.
As far as we are aware, no behavioral research has empirically tested pension fund
trustees decisions to investigate how the combination of group decisions, advice, and sur-
rogacy inﬂuence their decisions and, ultimately, the sustainability of our pensions. Given
how much inﬂuence trustees’ decisions have on asset allocation and by extension in ﬁnan-
cial markets, this is a surprising state of aﬀairs. Research in behavioral ﬁnance has had a
marked inﬂuence on policy in the past (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) and so we anticipate
that exploring the decisions made within pension funds may have wide ramiﬁcations for the
industry.
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